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Weimar Culture and the Rise 
of National Socialism: 
The Kampfbund fiir deutsche Kultur 
Alan E. Steinweis 
B ETWEEN 1928 and 1932, the National Socialist movement trans- formed itself from an insurgent fringe party into Germany's most potent political force. The most important factor in this dramatic 
turnabout in political fortunes was the rapid deterioration of the German 
economy beginning in 1929. It does not, however, logically follow that 
the German people simply fell into the lap of the party and its charismatic 
leader. To  the contrary, the party aggressively employed sophisticated 
propagandistic and organizational strategies for attracting and mobilizing 
diverse segments of German society. With the onset of the economic 
crisis, and the consequent social and political turmoil, the party stood 
ready to receive, organize, and mobilize Germans from all social strata.' 
Cultural issues featured prominently in propaganda, particularly in the 
latter, decisive phase of the Nazis' rise to power. After its breakthrough 
in the September 1930 Reichstag elections, the NSDAP wasted little time 
before going on a cultural offensive. In December 1930, for example, 
provocations in Berlin achieved a major symbolic victory, compelling 
the government to ban the film version of Remarque's All Quiet on the 
Western Front.' Despite such successes, the movement's reliance on artis- 
FO; their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the author would like to thank 
Geoffrey Giles, Wolfgang Natter, William S. Allen, and the participants in the faculty- 
graduate student colloquium of the Department of History, Florida State University. 
1. For background on the mobilization of various German constituencies, I have relied 
on the following works: Michael H. Kater, The Naz i  Party: A Social Projle of Members and 
Leaders, 1919-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1983); Thomas Chiiders, The Naz i  Voter: The Social 
Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1983); Detlef Miihlberger, 
Hitler's Followers: Studies in the Sociology of the Movement (London, 1991); and Jiirgen W. 
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tic and cultural strategies during its rise to power has not been subjected 
to rigorous analysis. Although several studies have examined the cultural 
policies implemented by the Nazis once in power, the historiography is 
deficient when it comes to the role of cultural politics in pre-1933 
mobilization strategies. Ironically, the use of art and culture as a political 
weapon by the left-wing parties has generated far more scholarly 
in te re~ t .~  
At the tinie of the seizure of power, the Kampfbundflr deutsche Kultur 
functioned as the movement's primary vehicle for cultural and artistic 
mobilization. Yet little is known about this organization. Although the 
Kampfbund forms the focus of a chapter in Reinhard Bollmus's authorita- 
tive study of Alfred Rosenberg's career in the movement, Bollmus 
concentrates primarily on the role of the Kampfbund in the Byzantine 
jurisdictional conflicts of the Third R e i ~ h . ~  In contrast, Bollmus says 
relatively little about the Kampfbund's contribution to the growth and 
popularity of the movement before 1933. Several recent turns in the 
historiography of the Weimar Republic and pre-1933 National Socialism 
would now make a fresh look at the Kampfbund particularly worthwhile. 
There has been a renewal of interest in the importance of broad cultural, 
as opposed to strictly socioeconomic, factors in the weakening of 
Weimar democracy and the success of N a z i ~ m . ~  Also increasingly preva- 
lent have been studies investigating the social, rather than the purely 
political, mechanisms through which the volkische worldview was dis- 
seminated among the German p~pu la t ion .~  The Kampfbund constitutes 
3. For a recent example see W. L. Guttsman, Workers' Culture in Weimar Germany: 
Between Tradition and Commitment (New York, 1990). 
4. Reinhard Bollmus, Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner: Studien zum Machtkampf im 
~tiom~sozialistischen Henschaftssystem (Stuttgart, 1970), 27-54. An earlier study s d  valuable 
for its detailed treatment of organizational and financial questions is Herbert P. Rothfeder, 
"A Study of Alfred Rosenberg's Organization for National Socialist Ideology" (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Michigan, 1963), 29-54. The classic study by Hildegard Brenner, Die 
Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus (Reinbek, 1963) is useful for context, but on issues 
related to the Kampfbund has been supplanted by Bollmus. Particularly insightful on the 
Kampfbund's activities in the sphere of architecture is Barbara Miller Lane, Architecture and 
Politics in Germany, 1918-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 148-60. Fred K. Prieberg, Musik 
im NS-Staat (Frankfurt, 1982). 3640, provides a useful sketch of Kampfaund activities in the 
music field. 
5. See Modris Eksteins, The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modem Age 
(Boston. 1989): Detlev, I. K. Peukert, "The Weirnar Republic--Old and new Perspectives," 
~ e r m a n ~ i s t o &  6 (1986: 133- -+ Thomas Childers,  he Social Language of Politics in 
Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic," American Histor- 
ical Review 95 (April 1990): 331-58; Larry Eugene Jones, "Culture and Politics in the 
Weimar Republic," in Gordon Martel, ed., Modern Germany Reconsidered (London, 1991). 
6. Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg 188G193.5 (Chapel Hi, 
1986); Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar 
Germany (New York, 1990). 
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an excellent case study of how artistic and cultural activism shaped the 
Nazi movement's public image during the later stages of the "time of 
struggle," helping to pave the party's path to social respectability among 
the propertied and educated middle class (Besitz und Bildungsburgertum). 
The origins of the KampJbund must be understood in two broader 
contexts: that of the cultural politics of the Weimar Republic, and that of 
the mobilization strategies employed by the National Socialist 
movement.' Conflict between tradition and experimentation on the 
artistic scene reflected the profound social and ideological cleavages of 
Weimar Germany. The efflorescence of artistic modernism after World 
War I had coincided with a profound shake-up of the social relationships 
and economic structures that had prevailed before the war. Thus, to 
many Germans, artistic modernism exacerbated a more fundamental 
disorientation. Believing the proper function of art to be a lifting of the 
spirit through an emphasis on beauty and heroism, the critics of modern- 
ism condemned forms of art conceived as means for exploring new 
perspectives on reality and for bringing society's blemishes into sharper 
focus. They believed that Germany had lost its traditional bearings, and 
that the new art functioned as a critical and corrosive force, promoting 
the unraveling of the social fabric by questioning the legitimacy of 
prevailing attitudes and institutions. Cultural anxiety manifested itself in 
many forms and across a wide political spectrum.' O n  the extreme 
Right, it often assumed the form of conspiracy theory: the threat to 
traditional German culture was said to emanate from a network of 
racially, spiritually, and even financially interconnected artistic and 
cultural movements, led by Jews and Marxists, promoted by feminists, 
and most conspicuously symbolized by the increasing visibility of "Ne- 
groes" on the art scene. 
Among Germans professionally involved in the arts, modernism could 
represent more than an affront to prevailing sensibilities. It could also 
pose a personal threat to artists who understood themselves to be the 
guardians of tradition, a role in which many took a good deal of pride, 
and for which several received handsome financial compensation. Para- 
7. Surveys on artistic and cultural trends in Weimar Germany include Peter Gay, Weimar 
Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York, 1968); Walter Laqueur. Weimar: A Cultural 
History (New York, 1974); Jost Hermand and Frank Trommler, Die Kultur der Weimarer 
Republik (Munich, 1978). Gary Stark, Entrepreneurs of Ideology: Neoconservative Publishers in 
Weimar Germany (Chapel Hill, 1981) also contains much useful material on cultural issues. 
8. I have attempted elsewhere to compare and contrast the Nazi artistic and cultural 
critique with those of other parties of the Weimar Right. See Alan E. Steinweis, "Conser- 
vatism, National Socialism, and the Cultural Crisis of the Weimar Republic," in Larry 
Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Between Reform, Reaction and Resistance: Studies in 
the History of German Conservatismfrom 1789 to 1945 (New York, 1992). 
doxically, the financially unsuccessful could conveniently blame their 
professional misfortunes on the new trends. The new art, they argued, 
dismissed the relevance of the taste and skills that they had been taught to 
cultivate, substituting instead an excessive emphasis on intellectual ab- 
stractions and political content. Furthermore, they contended, the new 
art had scared many average Germans away from galleries, theaters, and 
concert halls. German artists faced starvation, they argued, because 
German art had been uprooted from its nurturing soil, the p e ~ p l e . ~  By 
1932, the pool of unemployed artists in which such notions could take 
hold was enormous.1° 
The Kampfbund set forth as one of its paramount goals the need to 
educate Germans about the intimate connection between cultural decay 
and national decline. As the inaugural issue of the Kampfbund's newsletter 
explained, the "political and economic collapse of Germany" after the 
Great War had been "more than a merely external event." Rather, "it 
was only the metaphor for an inner lack of belief in the value of German- 
dom." Similarly, the chaos of Weimar politics merely signified a more 
fundamental malaise rooted in the "absence of a universally popular state 
and cultural ideal." The Kampfbund's founders conceived its mission as 
one of volkisch consciousness-raising. It was to "defend the value of the 
German essence" in the "midst of present-day cultural decadence" by 
promoting every "authentic [arteigene] expression of German cultural 
life." It would "enlighten" the German people about the "connections 
between race, art, and science." Through lectures and publications, it 
would promote the work and thought of "important" Germans who had 
been "silenced" by the forces of decay." 
Hitler and other Nazi leaders had scathingly denounced cultural "de- 
generacy" in speeches and writings since the early 1920s. The fact, then, 
that the party's systematic effort to instrumentalize cultural anxiety came 
only in 1928 requires some explanation. Since its refounding in 1925, the 
party's attempt to attract members from all classes of German society 
9. See "Dr. Stang spricht," Deutsche Kultur-Wacht 3 (hereafter cited as D K W ) ,  (1932). 
Many of the D K W  issues are not dated. 
10. The categories used by the Statistisches Reichsamt make it very dificult to reconstruct 
unemployment rates for artists. The categories found in the Statistisches JahrGuch's break- 
down of the occupational structure of German society do not correspond to those used to 
analyze unemployment. This is further complicated by the statistical invisibility nebenbe- 
rujicher artists who had entirely different official occupations. For the year 1932, the 
Reichsamt recorded a quarterly average of 33,118 unemployed in the category "Theater, 
Music, and Performance of All Types," representing .6 percent of all unemployed. A 
comparison with occupational census figures yields a rough estimate of 33 percent unem- 
ployment among artists. 
11. "Die Geisteswende," Mitteilungen des Kampfbundes fur Deutrche Kultur (hereafter cited 
as Mitteilungen), January 1929. 
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had met with mixed results. Whereas NSDAP recruitment efforts among 
the working class had yielded disappointing results, appeals to the middle 
and upper-middle classes had been more successful. The party leadership 
resolved, therefore, to concentrate its proselytizing on the various layers 
of the German bourgeoisie. Germans of the educated and propertied 
middle class presented a special recruitment challenge. Although not 
numerous in absolute terms, their adherence would lend respectability to 
a plebeian movement whose public image derived largely from its lower- 
middle-class base and its brown-shirted paramilitary auxiliary. The 
plebeian stigma had not necessarily had the effect of keeping elites out of 
the party; to the contrary, several categories of German elites had already 
demonstrated a higher-than-average proclivity for joining the party. 
Nonetheless, party leaders sensed that many members of the educated 
and cultural elite continued to shy away from participation in the move- 
ment, despite being quietly or potentially sympathetic.12 
The founding of the Kampfbundfir deutsche Kultur must therefore be 
viewed as part of the same NSDAP organizational reform of 1928-29 
that produced new party auxiliaries for university students, teachers, 
physicians, and lawyers.13 The specific circumstances of the Kampfbund's 
birth in 1928, however, remain somewhat obscure due to a paucity of 
documents. Bollmus attributes the main initiative to Alfred Rosenberg, 
editor of the Volkischer Beobachter, the NSDAP organ, and the party s 
unofficial chief spokesman on cultural matters. However, Hans Hinkel, 
founder and leader of the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter, claimed in a 
postwar statement that Hugo Bruckmann, the Munich right-wing pub- 
lisher, had been the main force in founding the Kampfbund, and that 
Rosenberg had merely commandeered it a short time later.l4 On the 
surface, the connection with the party appeared to consist mainly of 
overlapping personnel. Among the first set of thirteen directors, Franz 
X. Schwarz, the Nazi party treasurer, Franz Ritter von Epp, a retired 
general and Nazi Reichstag delegate, and Rosenberg himself were pub- 
licly identified with the Nazi movement. The remainder of the board 
consisted of prominent non-Nazi members of the German far right 
wing, such as publisher Julius F. Lehmann, mathematician Philipp 
Lenard, architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg, and Othmar Spann, a lead- 
12. Kater, Naz i  Party, 47-48. 
13. The question of National Socialist appeals to specific elite groups in German society 
has generated a substantial literature. Three notable examples are Geoffrey Giles, Students 
and National Socialism in Germany (Princeton, 1985); Michael H. Kater, Doctors under Hitler 
(Chapel Hill, 1989); and Konrad H. Jarausch, The Unf ee  Profssions: German Lawyers, 
Teachers, and Engineers, 1900-1950 (Oxford, 1990). 
14. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 30-31; Seventh Army Interrogation Report, SAlC Report 
28, "Hans Heinrich Hinkel," 27 May 1945, National Archives, Record Group 238. 
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ing exponent of corporatist theory.15 These ambiquities pose the ques- 
tion of whether the Kampfbund was at the very outset conceived as an 
NSDAP front organization, or as an autonomous entity embodying an 
alliance between National Socialists and other forces of the volkisch 
Right. In either case, by mid-1929 National Socialist influence in the 
Kampfbund had become preponderant, even though the connection be- 
tween the two organizations remained informal. 
Given the NSDAP's desire to penetrate the German upper bourgeoisie 
more effectively, keeping the Kampfbund at arm's length made good 
strategic sense. Not only would the Kampfbund avoid the plebeian stigma 
of the NSDAP, it would also exploit a widespread antipathy toward 
party politics that had infected the German middle and upper-middle 
classes.16 Thus, even as it sought to use art and culture to politicize 
Germans, the Kampfbund emphasized a pretense to apoliticism. In an 
effort to avoid possible party-related problems, its published "Operating 
Principles" stressed the non-party character of the organization. The 
"fundamental, universal-national" questions to be addressed by the 
Kampfbund did not "belong to the competence of political parties."" This 
official foreswearing of partisanship was reflected in the Kampfbund's 
official newsletter, in which references to the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler 
were conspicuously infrequent. The editors treated the NSDAP as a 
distinctly separate entity.l8 
Accordingly, the Kampfbund's founders foresaw not a centralized 
party-style organization, but rather a network of semi-autonomous local 
cultural associations, bearing the same label and pursuing similar goals. 
They assumed, or hoped, that the nature of social and associational life, 
especially in small communities, would enable relatively tiny cadres 
of activists to make their mark on political discourse and attitudes. 
Coordinated by a central office, and with the newsletter providing an 
"intellectual bond,"19 local activists were encouraged to act on their 
own initiatives in the planning of public lectures and other functions. 
15. "Arbeitsgrundsatze und Gliederung des Kampfbundes fiir Deutsche Kultur," Mit- 
teilungen, January 1929. 
16. On apoliticism as a phenomenon of the Weimar right wing see Kurt Sontheimer, 
Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Diepolitischen ldeen des deutschen National- 
ismus zwischen 1918 und 1933 (Munich, 1962), and Armin Mohler, Die konservative Revolu- 
tion in Deutschland 1918-1932 (Stuttgart, 1950). On grass-roots apoliticism among the 
German middle classes see Koshar, Social Life. 
17. "Arbeitsgrundskze," as in note 15. 
18. In the spring of 1930, when Diemer Willroda, the leader of the NSDAP's "Group 
Visual Artists" in Dresden, published a piece on "Art, Culture, and Nation" in the 
newsletter, the author was clearly identified as a guest contributor. "Kunst, Kultur und 
Nation," Mitteilungen, April-June, 1930. 
19. "Arbeitsgrundsatze," as in note 15. 
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Members were also especially encouraged to use word-of-mouth to 
"personally inform all acquaintances about the idea of the Kampfbund." 
Envisaging a kind of Nazi salon culture, the Kampfbund leadership hoped 
that "small groups of adherents" would gather for "monthly conversa- 
tion evenings" to discuss relevant issues and to "deepen personal 
familiarity. "*O 
Although the Kampjbund had announced its existence to the world in 
May 1928, its real work first began in early 1929. Operating out of a 
small office in Munich, the organization initiated publication of a news- 
letter, the Mitteilungen, in January 1929. The anonymous editors im- 
plored adherents to purchase "as many copies as possible" at ten Pfennige 
each, and to distribute them to "ideological comrades" (Cesinnungsgenos- 
sen) and to "honest persons who still stand o~ts ide ."~ '  Each issue con- 
tained one or two feature articles dealing in some depth with issues of 
culture and ideology. Several shorter pieces documented artistic and 
cultural developments around Germany from the Kampfbund's ideologi- 
cal perspective, often focusing on prominent exponents of modernism 
and socially critical art, such as Max Reinhardt. These articles were 
supplemented by previews or summaries of Kampjund-sponsored func- 
tions, and status reports on the growth and activities of various chapters 
around Germany. 
In February 1929 the Kampfbund initiated its series of public lectures. 
These functions, which were relatively inexpensive and easy to organize, 
became the most common form of Kampfbund-sponsored activity. 
Othmar Spann, a member of the Kampfbund Board of Directors, pre- 
sented the inaugural lecture. An economist best known for his espousal 
of the organic, corporatist state, Spann had already won substantial 
popularity among Weimar conservatives. His lecture, entitled "The 
Cultural Crisis of the Present," called for the elimination of liberalism 
and democracy, and their replacement by a system of authoritarian 
leadership supported by popular will. The lecture was a success in- 
asmuch as it attracted a large audience to the main auditorium at the 
University of Munich and stimulated attention in the press." A short 
time later, musicologist Alfred Heuss lectured at the university in 
Munich under Kampfbund auspices. Highly regarded for his research on 
Handel and Bach, Heuss was the editor of the prestigious Zeitschrij fur 
Musik. Heuss's Kampfbund lecture dealt with "The Crisis of German 
Music," bemoaning the "formal materialism" that had come to domi- 
20. "An die Arbeit," Mitteilungen, May 1929. 
21. "Aufforderung," Mifteilungen, January 1929. 
22. "Die Kulturkrise der Gegenwart," Mitteilungen, March 1939.,In the speech, Spann 
also made a point of praising the KampJbund's "non-partisanship" (Uberparteilichkeit). 
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nate German music at the expense of "metaphysical deepening."23 
After these appearances, neither Spann nor Heuss figured prominently 
in Kampfbund programming. The spotlight shifted in large part to Rosen- 
berg himself, signaling a shift toward a more pronounced National 
Socialist dominance of the organization. In April 1929, Rosenberg placed 
himself on the program for the first time. His lecture was an attack on the 
trend toward greater sensuality in art, which he saw as one arm in a 
pincers movement closing in on German culture. Rosenberg ominously 
described how African primitivism crept into central Europe from the 
south, promoted by "niggerized Americanism" and French "power 
politics." Meanwhile, the second pincer, formed by "Mongolian waves 
of bolshevism," besieged Germany from the east, threatening the "exter- 
mination of all German cultural values." Unless stopped, these forces 
would transform Germany into a formless "swamp culture" (Sumpf- 
kultur).'"hese dire portents reflected the volkisch right wing's preoc- 
cupation with the impulsiveness and sensuality of trends like jazz, and 
with the role played by Germany's internal and external enemies in the 
popularization of such movements. Kampfbund propaganda would seize 
on this theme repeatedly. A golden opportunity to emphasize the con- 
spiratorial nature of the threat presented itself in the spring of 1930, when 
Paul Robeson (a black) was scheduled to perform in Berlin under the 
auspices of Max Reinhardt (a Jew).25 
If Kampfbund adherents could take solace from the the scarcity of 
blacks in German society, elemental fears of emancipated women could 
not be so easily repressed. In the autumn of 1929, the Kampfbund 
launched its first of many attacks on female emancipation. It took the 
form of a newsletter article titled "Dollarism and Feminism," by one 
E. Klein-Wintermann of Leipzig. The article combined its indictment of 
emancipation with an attack on another favorite target, the mammonist 
culture of modern capitalism. The growing materialism and lascivious- 
ness of contemporary society, the author reasoned, stemmed from the 
unleashing of feminine instincts hitherto kept under control by civilized 
people. These included a lust for pleasure, the "gratification of all 
23. Donald W. Ellis, "Music in the Third Reich: National Socialist Aesthetic Theory as 
Governmental Policy" (Ph.D. diss., University of  Kansas, 1970). 33-35. 
24. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, May 1929. 
25. "Wider die Negerkultur-fir deutsches Volkstum," Mitteilungen, April-June 1930. 
On an earlier Kampfbund attack on Reinhardt see "Der Fall Reinhardt," Mitteilungen, April 
1929. On German prejudices toward blacks and "coloreds" during the Weimar era see 
Reiner Pommerin, "Sterilisierung der Rheinlandbastarde": Das Schicksal einer farbigen deutschen 
Minderheit 1918-1937 (Diisseldorf, 1979); Gisela Lebzelter, "Die 'Schwarze Schrnach': 
V~rurteildropa~anda-Mythos," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 11 (1985): 37-58; and Sally 
Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice, and Prurience," 
European Studies Review 13 (1983): 297-334. 
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imaginable vanities," and "indulgence of every possible sensual and 
sensory titillation up to the most refined sadism." Klein-Wintermann 
saw the descent into an "animalistic life of instinct" as "the quintessence 
of a specifically feminine-determined civilization process." As the arti- 
cle's title suggested, this particular form of degeneration was especially 
acute in the United States. Echoing a widely accepted stereotype of 
A m e r i ~ a , ~ ~  Klein-Wintermann depicted an uncultured society, a "dollar 
paradise" obsessed with technology (e.g. "senseless automobile driv- 
ing") and an unbridled materialism. At the heart of this allegedly de- 
generate system stood "the American female," whose licentiousness and 
"unparalleled extravagance" had reduced her male companion (the 
"Yankee") to a "work and love slave," a "trained poodle," an "indus- 
triously rotating dollar generator," whose main purpose in life had 
become the satiation of his mate's acquisitiveness and lust for physical 
pleasure. To Klein-Wintermann, therefore, America presented a worst- 
case scenario for unrestrained capitalism's ability to debase the soul, and 
to emasculate the male. "Americanization" would inevitably produce the 
same result in Germany.27 
While lectures, literary readings, and music recitals accounted for the 
majority of Kampfbund programs between 1929 and 1931, some local 
chapters seized the initiative to undertake more ambitious projects. The 
Bonn chapter organized an "Exhibition of the Good German Book," in 
December 1929. The Bonn Kampfbund arranged for special displays of 
nationalistic books to be set up in local bookstores, which could in turn 
integrate the displays into pre-Christmas pr~motions.~' In early 1930, 
the Diisseldorf chapter attempted to persuade the city monuments com- 
mission to erect a memorial to Albert Leo Schlageter, the German 
nationalist martyr who, in 1923, had been executed by French occupa- 
tion authorities in the Rhineland.29 At the same time, the Kampfbund 
activists lobbied against the erection of a monument to Diisseldorfs 
most controversial son, the poet Heinrich Heine, a baptized Jew and 
political di~sident.~' In April 1930, the same Diisseldorf chapter spon- 
sored an elaborate Bismarck festival in the city's concert hall, with the 
music provided by the local Association of Retired Military  musician^.^' 
26. In his anti-Americanism, Klein-Wintermann was picking up on a theme developed 
more fully in A. Halfeld's book America and Americanism Uena, 1927). Stark, Entrepreneurs of 
Ideology, 177. 
27. "Dollarismus und Feminismus," Mitteilungen, September-October 1929. 
28. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, November-December, 1929. 
29. On the creation and exploitation of the Schlageter myth, see Jay Baird, T o  Die for 
Germany: Heroes in the Naz i  Pantheon (Bloomington, 1990), chapter 2. 
30. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, January-March, 1930. 
31. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, June-August, 1930. 
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Conceived essentially on the model of the Bildungsburgertum, the 
Kampfbund did not attract members in numbers comparable to those of 
mass organizations or political parties. From April 1929 to January 1932, 
membership climbed from 300 to around 2,100.32 During this period the 
Mitteilungen published the names and, in most cases, occupations of 527 
new members (i.e., about 25 percent of all members) who had agreed 
publicly to acknowledge their connection with the Kampfbund. The 
Appendix presents a sociographic analysis of this data, from which several 
significant patterns emerge. The Kampfbund, not surprisingly, overwhelm- 
ingly attracted elite segments of the German bourgeoisie. The university 
milieu produced 17.1 percent of the sample, with professors forming the 
largest single subgroup, representing 12.5 percent of the entire sample. 
Academic professionals from fields such as the law, medicine, and educa- 
tion constituted an additional 19 percent of the sample. Artists and 
intellectuals, including writers, editors, performing artists, visual artists, 
and architects, made up 15.1 percent of the member sample. Entre- 
preneurs, including several publishers and manufacturers, together with 
high-level business managers, such as syndics and executive directors 
(Gescha$s&hrer), combined to form 5.9 percent of the sample. A bit 
higher, at 6.1 percent, was the representation of middle and high-level 
civil servants. Nobility with ranks higher than von and socialites repre- 
sented 4.2 percent of the sample, and other elites (parsons, officials of 
social-cultural associations) represented 4.5 percent of the sample. Taken 
together, all of these socially elite groups, which accounted for less than 3 
percent of the total German adult p ~ p u l a t i o n , ~ ~  constituted 71.9 percent 
of the Kampfbund sample. 
Beyond the Besitz und Bildungsburgertum, the sample reflects the Kampf- 
bund's particular attraction for members of the nobility. Of  the sample's 
twenty-two noblemen and noblewomen with titles above the rank of 
von, nineteen listed no further o c ~ u p a t i o n . ~ ~  Among them were three 
princes (including Wolrad and Friedrich Christian of Schaumburg- 
Lippe), one princess, and one archprincess. By late 1929, the Kampfbund 
could also count among its adherents Walter von Bogen u. Schostedt, the 
executive director of the German Society of Nobility (Deutsche Adels- 
genossenschaft) . 
Among lower-middle-class members of the sample, merchants 
(KaufIeute) and small businessmen were the most prominent, constitut- 
ing 8.2 percent of the total sample. Low-level white-collar employees 
formed 5.7 percent of the sample, and low-level civil servants an 
32. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 29. 
33. Kater, Nazi Party, 241. 
34. An additional twenty-one held the title of von. 
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additional 1.5 percent. Only two of the listed members, a machine 
builder and a railroad assistant, could be classified as skilled manual 
workers. Taken together, these petit-bourgeois groups (adding in 
widows and pensioners) composed only 18.6 percent of the Kampfbund 
sample. By comparison, these social categories formed the collective 
backbone of the NSDAP, accounting for well over 50 percent of all 
card-carrying party members. 
Women constituted 15.7 percent of the Kampfbund sample, suggesting 
a level of female representation in the Kampfbund roughly double that 
encountered in the NSDAP, which discouraged female member~h ip .~~  It 
was, perhaps, precisely the pronounced antifeminism noted earlier that 
attracted tradition-minded women to the Kampfbund. For thirty-one of 
the eighty-three women in the sample, no occupation was listed, indicat- 
ing a strong probability that many fulfilled traditional gender roles as 
wives and mothers. The sample includes four noblewomen and three 
socialites. Several women in the sample were listed as representatives of 
conservative and traditional organizations such as the Richard Wagner 
Association of German Women (Richard- Wagner- Verband deutscher 
Frauen), the League of German Girl Scouts (Bund deutscher Pfadjnderin- 
nen), and the Association for German Women's Culture (Verband fur 
Deutsche Frauenkultur). In addition to five women who listed themselves 
as "widows," there were many who identified themselves as spouses 
(e.g., Geh. Ratsgattin). Although these characteristics of the female mem- 
bership further underscore the Kampfbund's traditionalist attraction, one 
should not overlook the presence of significant numbers of females in the 
professional, artistic, and intellectual subgroups.36 Moreover, several 
women performed important functions for the organization. Winifried 
Wagner and Eva Chamberlain gave the Kampfbund their blessing, and 
allowed their names to be associated with it publicly. Elsa Bruckmann, 
wife of the conservative publisher Hugo Bruckmann, was a member of 
the first Board of Directors. Other women were engaged as performers 
at Kampfbund-sponsored events, particularly in Munich. In November 
1929, Countess Edlth Salburg read from her writings about "old Aus- 
trian reminiscences" at a "social evening" held at the Munich Men's 
Club. The next month, Irma Strunz-Bargehr, a retired Berlin actress, 
read excerpts from Holderlin, Goethe, and Schiller at the Munich Fest- 
saal. In February 1930, singer Emmy Kriiger of Bayreuth performed 
35. Kater, Nazi  Party, 254. 
36. For lucid discussions of the phenomenon of right-wing women in the Weimar 
Republic see Jill Stephenson, The Nazi  Organisation of Women (London, 1981), chapter 1; 
Ute Frevert, Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation, 
trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (New York, 1989). chapter 15; and Renate Bridenthal et al., 
When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi  Germany (New York, 1984). 
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ballads during an evening of "rich artistic enjoyment." In May 1930, 
Juga Krannhals-Russel, wife of Paul Krannhals, a leading theorist of the 
authoritarian "organic state," read from her poems.37 
Aside from considerations of class and gender, the Kampfbund lists also 
reflect the geographical distribution of members before 1932, suggesting 
a pattern of highly localized organizational success. As with most grass- 
roots organizations, much depended on the ability and determination of 
activists on the scene. Of the sample's 527 names, sixty-seven listed 
Munich as the city of residence. The other larger chapters were Dresden, 
with forty-six names in the sample; BonntBad Godesberg, with forty- 
four; Dusseldorf, with thirty-two, and Berlin, with thirty. Heidelberg, 
like Bonn an old university town, was home to twenty-eight of those 
appearing on the lists, while Jena, site of another university, had thirteen 
names in the sample. On the other hand, only a single member was listed 
for Tubingen, the site of a venerable university, while none were listed 
for the university towns of Marburg and Gottingen. In Bavaria, outside 
of the cultural center of Munich, the Kampfbund established a significant 
presence only in Nuremberg (including Erlangen), home to nine mem- 
bers on the lists, and, oddly, the small city of Nordlingen, whose six 
acknowledged Kampfbund members included the mayor. This pattern of 
isolated successes held true for northern Germany as well. For example 
the lists showed no members in Bremen, and only four each in Hanover 
and Hamburg. Yet the obscure community of Quakenbruck placed four 
residents on the membership lists, while the nearby cities of Oldenburg 
and Osnabruck had only one acknowledged member between them. 
The lists reveal still another important dimension to the Kampfbund's 
growth between 1928 and 1931. One finds numerous examples of group- 
joining by persons drawn from common social or occupational environ- 
ments. In early 1930, seven Heidelberg university students joined at 
around the same time, as did two teachers from Weissenfels. In the 
spring of 1930, four merchants joined in Dusseldorf, as did two widows 
in Karlsruhe, two junior lawyers (Referendare) in Oppeln, and two retired 
civil servants in Pocking (near Munich). These patterns suggest that 
word-of-mouth and small-scale, informal organizing among personal 
acquaintances did assist in the Kampfbund's growth, much as the founders 
had intended.38 At the end of 1929, the Board of Directors expressed 
satisfaction that Kampfbund members had hosted numerous "functions in 
37. Information from the sections "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, 
November-December 1929-June-August 1930. 
38. This conclusion supports the findings of Koshar, Social Life, on the social roots of 
National Socialism in Marburg. There is no record of pre-1933 Kampfbund activity in that 
university town. 
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intimate circles" to supplement the more visible public programs.39 
O n  only one occasion prior to 1933 did the Kampfbund enjoy an 
opportunity to exercise direct political power. When National Socialist 
Wilhelm Frick became Minister of the Interior and Culture in a right- 
wing coalition in Thuringia between January 1930 and April 1931, he 
appointed Hans Severus Ziegler, leader of the Thuringian Kampfbund, to 
the post of "Culture, Art, and Theater Specialist." Ziegler used his 
position to coordinate a purge of modern art from museums and public 
buildings under his jurisdiction. Noting the need to protect "moral 
forces" against "alien racial influences" and the "glorification of Negro- 
ism," Frick proclaimed restrictions on performances of "jazz band and 
percussion music, Negro dances, [and] Negro songs." The Kampfbund 
newsletter, while carefully avoiding mention of Frick's connection with 
the NSDAP, warmly praised the measures in Thuringia, noting that "for 
the first time since 1918, something official is being undertaken against 
racial and spiritual decomposition. '''O 
Frick and Ziegler also brought in Paul Schultze-Naumburg to head the 
State Academy of Art in Weimar. An original member of the Kampf- 
bund's Board of Directors, Schultze-Naumburg had gradually emerged 
as the Kampfbund's leading public spokesman after Rosenberg. Schultze- 
Naumburg is known primarily for his notorious book Kunst und Rasse 
(Art and Race), published in 1928, in which he argued that the images 
depicted in abstract or expressionist painting were accurate manifesta- 
tions of the artists' own state of racial decay. The patent absurdity of this 
theory should not be permitted to obscure the fact that Schultze- 
Naumburg had once been counted among Germany's most respected 
 architect^.^' As a proponent of a kind of progressive historicism in the 
latter years of the German Empire and the early years of the Weimar 
Republic, Schultze-Naumburg had sought to synthesize the geometric 
simplicity of the emerging modern style with essential characteristics of 
traditional German home design. But the audacity and quick pace of 
architectural experimentation in the 1920s transformed Schultze- 
Naumburg into one of the leading critics of modern a r~h i t ec tu r e .~~  A 
figure of Schultze-Naumburg's stature undoubtedly helped pave the 
Kampfbund's way to legitimacy in many circles. 
With Kampfbund activists at least temporarily inhabiting positions of 
39. "Das erste Jahr," Mitteilungen, November-December 1929. 
40. "Wider die Negerkultur," Mitteilungen, as in note 25. 
41. For example, Berthold Hinz, Art in the Third Reich (New York, 1979), 25, describes 
Schultze-Naumburg as "one of the leading cultural ideologists of National Socialism," but 
makes no mention of his earlier progressive tendencies. 
42. Lane, Architecture, 156-60. 
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power in Thuringia, the organization chose Weimar, the province's 
capital, as the site for a threeday youth festival in June 1930. Conspic- 
uous on the list of the twenty-eight participating youth organizations 
were the National Socialist Student League (NS-Studentenbund), the Hit- 
ler Youth, and several other groups connected to the Nazi party. Other 
participants included the Wandervogel, the League of German Girl Scouts, 
and the National Association of German Ofticers (Nationalverband deut- 
scher Ofiziere). Determined to "combat all manifestations destructive to 
race and nation," the assembled youth marched through the streets, 
participated in "strenuous" sporting events, and heard numerous 
nationalistic speeches.43 
If the events in Thuringia had contributed to the merging of the 
Kampfbund's public identity with that of the NSDAP, developments in 
the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter erased all remaining distinctions. Hans 
Hinkel, a professional Nazi activist and propagandist from the earliest 
days of the movement, founded the Berlin chapter in 1930. In 1932, 
Hinkel, known for his impetuousness and ambition, struck a deal with 
Joseph Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin, according to which the Kampf- 
bund would serve as the party's "major bearer of the struggle for Ger- 
man culture" in Berlin. Goebbels ordered all NSDAP members in his 
Gau who were artists and "culture creators" to join the Kam~fbund.~~ It 
was, however, still possible to be a Kampfbund member without joining 
the party; the Kampfbund thus retained its function as a back door into the 
Nazi movement for reluctant Germans. As an NSDAP document from 
September 1932 explained, the Kampfbund "struggles for the promotion 
of German culture as defined by Adolf Hitler, however it does not 
restrict its work to members of the Nazi party." The Kampfbund could 
therefore "appeal to persons active in German cultural life who decline a 
formal connection with the party." The Kampfbund would "agitate and 
assemble" culturally active Germans, drawing them into a circle that 
would, ideally, "prepare them for entry into the Nazi party," or, at least, 
into an "atmosphere" imbued with the "principles of the National 
Socialist movement. "45 
In 1932 the Berlin Kampfbund also intensified its propaganda and 
programs aimed specifically at professional artists, seeking to transform 
the chapter into a shadow professional association (Berufsverband) mod- 
elled on other NSDAP professional auxi l ia r ie~.~~ In the politically rarified 
43. "Weimar," Mitteilungen, JuneAugust 1930. 
44. "NSDAP Wr Deutsche Kultur," DKW 3 (1932). 
45. "Abmachungen zwischen der Abtl. Volksbildung und dem Kampfbund fir deutsche 
Kultur," 24 September 1932, Berlin Document Center (hereafter cited as BDC), Research 
Files, Binder 211. 
46. "Tatigkeit des KfDK--Gruppe Berlin," DKW 3 (1932). 
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cultural environment of Berlin, many artists responded. The Berlin 
musician Giinther Thiele described how the Kampfbund had assisted in his 
conversion to National Socialism: 
Before I entered the party, I joined my National Socialist professional 
group of the Kampfbund fur deutsche Kultur. My registration was on 
1 October 1932, under number 4624 (Group Music). In the many 
weekly meetings I heard discussions of the goals of the Bund. Even 
when the audience contained only thirty to forty listeners . . . the 
speakers implanted in me the idea of the Bund and the struggle against 
Jewish art and against many Jewish artists. I then committed myself 
against everything J e w i ~ h . ~ '  
In addition to raising the Kampfbund's profile to artists such as Thiele, 
Hinkel's maneuvers in Berlin had several further important conse- 
quences. They made Hinkel a prominent party figure on the Berlin 
cultural scene, positioning him strategically for powerful appointments 
after the seizure of power; they gave Gauleiter Goebbels a major voice in 
the affairs of an organization that was nominally under the leadership of 
his competitor Alfred Rosenberg; they transferred the center of Karnpf- 
bund activity from Munich to Berlin; and they significantly increased the 
size of the Kampfbund's membership. During 1932, total Kampfbund 
membership for the entire Reich rose from 2,100 to around 6,000.48 
Although a good portion of this increase must be attributed to the overall 
growth of the Nazi movement's popularity, one must surmise that the 
Hinkel-Goebbels arrangement in Berlin played a major role as well. 
Under Hinkel's leadership, the Berlin chapter attracted the participa- 
tion of several prestigious figures from the local cultural scene. In the 
field of music, among the most active was Professor Doctor h.c. Gustav 
Havemann. A violinist, Havemann had become concertmaster of the 
Lubeck orchestra in 1901 at the age of 19. At age 27 he took over the 
concertmaster's seat in Hamburg, and at age 33, in 1915, he moved on to 
the same position at the State Opera in Dresden, one of Germany's finest 
and most prestigious cultural institutions. In 1920, Havemann was 
appointed Professor of Violin at the Academy of Music in Berlin, argu- 
ably the pinnacle of music pedagogy. Like Schultze-Naumburg, Have- 
mann had come of age in an earlier era, and had experienced the shock of 
the new with the coming of the Republic. Precisely when he turned to 
the Kampfbund is not known. By the end of 1932 he had joined the 
directorate of the Music Section of the Kampfbund, had become director 
47. Statement by Thiele, 30 April 1936, BDC, Reichskulturkammer collection, file of 
Giinther Thiele. 
48. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 29. 
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of the newly founded Kampfbund symphony orchestra in Berlin, and had 
contributed anti-Semitic articles to Kampfbund publications.49 Other 
prominent musical figures active for the Kampfbund were Clemens 
Krauss, musical director at the Berlin City Opera, who led the opera 
section of the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter; Professor Max Trapp, a teacher of 
composition at the Berlin Academy of Music and member of the Prus- 
sian Academy of Arts, who served as coordinator for serious music in the 
Kampfbund's Berlin chapter; and Prof. Dr. h.c. Paul Graener, who served 
as the Berlin chapter's expert for music education. A member of the 
Prussian Academy of Arts, Graener had been a conductor at the Royal 
Academy of Music in London as early as 1896, had directed the Mozar- 
teum in Salzburg from 1910 to 1914, and had directed the prestigious 
Stern Conservatory in Berlin since 1930.'O 
In 1932, the Berlin chapter initiated publication of the Deutsche Kultur- 
W~cht.~' This illustrated journal, edited by Hinkel, featured articles on 
diverse aspects of high and popular culture. The very first issue boasted 
on page one of the Kampfbund-Berlin's commitment to the cause of "our 
Fuhrer" Adolf Hitler, and to its intimate association with the NSDAP.52 
The second issue to appear in 1932 contained a declaration of support for 
Adolf Hitler signed by fifty-four university instructors, forty-five of 
whom possessed the title of professor.53 Many of the signatories were 
scholars in the fields of ethnography, cultural history, art, music, and 
literature: Ludwig Muhlhausen of Hamburg was an expert on Celtic 
philology; Anton Jirku of Breslau specialized in the history of the Jews of 
antiquity; Eugen Fehrle of Heidelberg was an authority on German 
folklore and festivals; Karl Endemann of Heidelberg had published 
authoritative works on the Sotho languages of southern Africa; Karl 
Bornhausen of Breslau had authored a study of Pascal's ethics; Ewald 
Banse of Braunschweig was a prolific scholar of the culture and geogra- 
phy of Asia Minor and North Africa; and Karl Matthaei of Tiibingen 
specialized in the history and performance of organ music.54 
49. For example, "Was ich vom Kampfbund fir deutsche Kultur fur die Musik 
erwarte," D K W ,  special issue (1932). For biographical background see Joseph Wulf, Musik 
im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation (Gutersloh, 1963; Frankfurt, 1983). 20. 
50. For biographical data see Wulf, Musik, 15 (Graener), 204 (Trapp), and Boguslaw 
Drewniak, Das Theater im NS-Staat: Szenarium deutscher Zeitgeschichte (Dusseldorf, 1983), 
399 (Krauss). For their offices in the Kampfbund, see D K W  3 (1932): 18-19. 
51. The Kampfbund Reich leadership had been planning to issue its own publication, but 
decided not to after the Gruppe Berlin seized the initiative to publish its own journal. "Die 
'Kultur-Wachtl-Reichsorgan des KtDK," D K W  3 (1932). 
52. "Wir gehen in Front," D K W  1 (1932). 
53. "Deutsche Hochschullehrer bekennen sich fur den Fuhrer der nationalsozialistischen 
Bewegung," D K W  2 (1932). 
54. Biographical data in Kurschners Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender (Berlin, 1928129). Muhl- 
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Kampfbund propaganda, as transmitted through the Kultur- Wacht, 
points up two important characteristics of the cultural agenda of the 
National Socialist movement on the eve of its seizure of power, both of 
which are important for understanding the evolution of state cultural 
policy after 1933. First, the selection of articles represented a mix of 
crude racial theory with more mainstream, conservative perspectives on 
culture. Racist treatises, exposOs on Jewish-Marxist influence in the arts, 
and demands for the elimination of foreigners from German cultural life 
appeared side by side with feature articles on figures such as Schiller. 
This hybrid of tradition and radicalism would remain a hallmark of Nazi 
cultural policy. 
A second area of emphasis in the Kultur- Wacht addressed the supposed 
ravages of capitalism on the material welfare of German artists. The 
problem in the arts was simply not one of so-called degeneracy, but also 
one of misdirected financing, poor central planning, and disparities be- 
tween supply and demand for the services of artists. The magazine 
provided a forum for ideas about how such problems could be addressed 
through fundamental economic and structural reform of the arts. For 
example, many articles sketched out ideas for rationalization of the 
German theater economy, emphasizing the theme of deliberalization, 
which usually entailed a combination of professionalization measures, 
work-creation programs, and audience mass-subscription arrange- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~  In the field of music, the Kampfbund called for greater official 
regulation of the progressive "mechanization" of music through radio, 
film, and records, and for replacing the existing fractious, increasingly 
impotent labor unions and professional associations with a corporatist 
"unified representation of the music estate" that would look out for 
musicians' economic interests and social concerns more effe~tively.~~ 
In addition to initiating publication of the Kultur- Wacht, the Kampfbund 
expanded its lecture programming significantly in 1932. A high percent- 
age of the public lectures sponsored by the Kampfbund featured bona fide 
academics speaking on seemingly apolitical topics, such as "Goethe and 
hausen's edited edition of Die Vier Zweige des Mabinogi (Pedeir ceinc y Mabinogi), originally 
published in 1925, has been recently republished (Tiibingen, 1988). Other notable publica- 
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Karl Endemann, ed., Wiirterbuch der Sotho-Sprache (Hamburg, 1911); Karl Bornhausen, Die 
Ethik Pascals (Giessen, 1907); Ewald Banse, Die Turkei: Eine Modeme Geographie (Braun- 
schweig, 1919); Karl Matthaei, Ausgewahlte Orgelwerke, 5 vols. (Kassel, 1928-36). 
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(October 1990j: 441-59. 
56. "Allgemeine Richtlinien des 'Kampfbundes fir deutsche Kultur," im Hinblick auf 
seine musikalischen Aufgaben," D K W  2 (1932). 
Nature, " and "Heroism and Human Greatness. "57 German Bestelmeyer, 
the President of the Academy of Visual Arts in Munich, and also a 
professor of architecture at the prestigious Technical University in the 
Bavarian capital,58 delivered an address on "Objectivity in Old and New 
Architecture. " Other Kampfbund-sponsored lectures tended to emphasize 
themes closer to the core of Nazi ideology. Paul Schultze-Naumburg 
continued to be a popular attraction. 
Aside from overt propaganda, the Kampfbund sponsored musical and 
theatrical performances with increasing frequency in 1932. Kampfbund 
concerts emphasized the music of great German composers, such as 
Handel, Bach, and Mozart, and also provided exposure to the works of 
contemporary composers, exponents of traditionalism such as Paul 
Graener, Max Trapp, and Hans Bullerian, whose compositions had 
supposedly been suppressed by the dominant Jewish cabal to bolshevize 
culture. In the realm of theater, 1932 saw the Kampfbund initiate a theater 
subscription plan in Munich. The plan was designed to enable the Kampf- 
bund to sponsor its own productions, which would play before full 
houses of subscribers who had purchased tickets at substantial discounts. 
This was not an original plan; the efficacy ofthe subscription arrange- 
ment had already been demonstrated by the Volksbuhne and similar theater 
organizations of the Weimar era.59 The Kamp3und's mediocre produc- 
tions of obscure pieces, however, were poorly attended, lost a good deal 
of money, and were halted after only a few months. Yet the failed 
experiment did not undermine the National Socialists' faith in the feasi- 
bility and political utility of a mass theater subscription scheme, which 
the Kraft durch Freude organization implemented with immense success 
during the Nazi regime.60 
When the Nazi party came to power in 1933, it appeared that the 
Kampfbund might acquire a dominant role in German cultural life. Nazi 
officials appointed Kampfbund activists to pivotal positions in cultural 
administrations at the state and Reich levels. The leader of the Berlin 
chapter, the Nazi "Old Fighter" Hans Hinkel, was appointed by Her- 
mann Goring to head the,Prussian Theater Commission, which, in the 
spring of 1933, supervised the mass dismissals of ideologically unaccept- 
able theater personnel in Germany's largest state.61 Kampfbund activists 
57. D K W  4 (1932): 13-14. 
58. Biographical data in Kurschners Deutscher Celehrten-Kalender (Berlin, 1928129). 
59. For an explanation see Guttsman, Workers' Culture, 208. 
60. On the success of KdF entertainment programs see Otto Marrenbach, ed., Fun- 
damente des Sieges: Die  Cesamtarbeit der Deutschen Arbeitsfront von 1933 bis 1940 (Berlin, 
1940). 334-35. 
61. Comitt des DBtgations Juives, Das Schwarzbuch: Tatsachen und Dokumente. Die  Lage 
derluden in Deutschland 1933 (Paris, 1934). 423. 
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were instrumental in the political "coordination" of professional associa- 
tions and labor unions in the cultural sector; Gustav Havemann, for 
example, seized control of Germany's largest musicians' union, the Ger- 
man Musician's Association (Deutscher Musiker Ve rb~nd) .~~  Throughout 
Germany, artists rushed to join the Kampfbund. Between January and 
October, membership rose from 6,000 to 38,000.63 Most of the new 
members joined for opportunistic reasons, figuring that membership 
would increase job security or improve future prospects, although quite 
a few probably felt genuinely grateful for the opportunity to join a 
movement with which they had quietly sympathized in the past. 
The rapid growth of the Kampfbund in 1933, both in size and in 
influence, proved deceptive. The Kampfbund had served as a useful tool 
during the rise to power and the phase of political "coordination." By 
the beginning of 1934, however, the new Reich Ministry of Propaganda, 
together with the ministry-supervised Reich Chamber of Culture (Reichs- 
kulturkammer), both under the leadership of Joseph Goebbels, had out- 
maneuvered Rosenberg in the quest to institutionalize Nazi control of the 
arts. As the compulsory professional organization for culture, the Cham- 
ber of Culture embodied many of the very corporatist reform concepts 
that the Kampfbund had advocated. Ironically, compulsory membership 
for artists in the Chamber of Culture undermined the Kampfbund's base 
of support. Artists no longer perceived an urgent need to join the 
Kampfbund, as they had during the confused months of 1933. The decline 
of the Kampfbund also resulted from Hitler's lack of faith in Rosenberg's 
capacity to administer a large organization, as well as the Fuhrer's con- 
fidence in the ability of Goebbels to reconcile the German culture estab- 
lishment to Nazi rule. The Kampfbund suffered a severe diminution in 
influence and status, and from 1934 on, under a new name, the National 
Socialist Culture Community (Nationalsozialistische Kulturgemeinde) exer- 
cised only minor influence in German cultural affairs. Removed from the 
center of power, Rosenberg's new organization quickly emerged as a 
hard-line critic of Goebbels's Chamber of Culture, accusing him of 
coddling modernists and of moving too slowly on the purge of Jews 
from German artistic life.64 
Despite its rapid decline, the Kampfbund had left an important legacy. 
It had helped set much of the cultural agenda for the Third Reich, 
aggressively promoting corporatism, anti-Semitism, and a hybrid of 
62. Documents in BDC, Reichskulturkammer collection, file of Gustav Havemann, and 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Reichskulturkammer-Zentrale (R561), file 66. 
63. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 29. 
64. See Volker Dahm, "Die Reichskulturkammer als Instrument kulturpolitischer 
Steuerung und sozialer Reglementierung," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 34 (January 
1986): 53-84. 
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artistic conservatism and "Blood and Soil" radicalism. It had also served 
as a training ground for many activists who, after 1933, migrated to key 
positions in the Propaganda Ministry or in the Chamber of Culture. In 
1940, Hans Hinkel, who had come to occupy several influential positions 
in the Propaganda Ministry and the Chamber of Culture, recalled that 
many "old activists" from the Kampfbund were "still around in this 
sector. "65 In addition to Hinkel, notable Kampfbund veterans wielding 
power in the Chamber of Culture included the writer Hanns Johst, who 
served as President of the Reich Literature Chamber from 1935 to 1945, 
Otto Laubinger, who led the Reich Theater Chamber from 1933 until his 
death in 1935, and Heinz Ihlert, who ran the day-to-day operation of the 
Reich Music Chamber in his capacity as Executive Director. 
How significant a role had the Kampfbund played in helping the Nazi 
movement to power? Until 1932, antirepublican Germans energized by 
artistic and cultural antimodernism saw the Kampfbund as a means for 
engaging in the struggle against "decay" while avoiding the descent into 
party politics. lnitially reluctant to sign on with the Nazis, respectable 
citizens, some of them prominent, lent their names (if not their active 
participation) to the Kampfbund. In doing so, they avoided direct iden- 
tification with the Hitler party for a time, but nevertheless conferred 
respectability on an artistic and cultural worldview consistent with that 
of the NSDAP. When the Kampfbund began openly and explicitly to 
boast of its support for Hitler in 1932, it had already secured its image as 
a reputable organization with numerous socially and artistically promi- 
nent members. 
Between 1929 and Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship on 
30 January 1933, elite support for the Nazi movement grew in almost 
every measurable respect, be it in terms of party membership, electoral 
support, or affiliation with professional front  organization^.^^ Several 
factors converged to produce this shift in favor of National Socialism: 
intensifying fears of communism, frustration with the messy politics of 
the Weimar "system," and perceived economic self-interest. The case of 
the Kampfbund suggests that the National Socialist movement's skill at 
exploiting the widespread cultural anxiety of the Weimar era was a 
further significant factor in the formation of the Nazi upper-middle-class 
constituency. 
65. Hinkel to Johst, 20 February 1940, BDC, Reichskulturkammer collection, file of 
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APPENDIX 
Occupation/Social Background of Self-Acknowledged 
Kampfound Joiners, 1928-193 1 
University milieu 
Professors 
Instructors 
Students 
Entrepreneurs & upper management 
High and middle civil servants 
Professionals 
Medicine 
L a w  
Education 
Engineers 
Other 
Artists-intellectuals 
Writers, editors, journalists 
Artists 
Architects 
Nobility (above von) 
Socialites 
Other 
Parsons 
Oficials of social-cultural 
associations 
ALAN E. STEINWEIS 
Lower-middle class 
L o w  civil servants 
White-collar employees 
Merchants/small business 
Skilled workers/crajismen 
Widows G pensioners 
N o  occupation/social position 
listed 
Source: Lists of new members published in the Mitteilungen des Kampfbundes fur Deutsche 
Kultur, January 1929-JulylDecember 1931. 
Note: The Mitteilungen listed new individual members who agreed to have their names 
published. Since the estimated total membership of the Kampfbund was 2,100 as ofJanuary 
1932, the published names represent about 25 percent of the total membership. 
Explanation and examples of categories: Professors: holders of the title Professor, Instruc- 
tors: holders of the title Privatdozent; Students: those identified explicitly as Student or 
degree candidate, e.g., stud. theol.; High and Middle Civil Servants: mainly those holding 
the title Rat, Geheimrat, Regienrngsrat; Low Civil Servants: e.g., Regienrngsbaumeister, 
Polizeiwachtmeister, Entrepreneurs: Fabrikant, Fabrikbesitzer, Verleger, etc.; Upper Manage- 
ment: e.g., Syndikus, Geschiifisfuhrer, Verwaltungsdirektor, Postinspektor; White-Collar 
Employees: e.g., Angestellter, Sekretar, Prokurist, Assistent, Buchhalter, MerchantsISmall 
Business: e.g., Kaufmann, Landwirt, Buchhandler, Skilled Workers and Craftsmen: one 
Maschinenbauer and one Eisenbahnassistent; Medicine: Arzt, Zahnarzt; Law: Rechtsanwalt, 
Referendar, Education: Lehrer, Studienrat; Engineers: Dipl. Ingenieur, Chemiker, Other pro- 
fessionals: Apotheker, Wissenschajiler, Archivar, Artists: Musiker, Kunstmaler, etc.; Parsons: 
counted only if no other function or occupation is given; Officials of social-cultural 
organizations: representatives of, e.g., Pfadjnder, Deutscher Frauen-Kampfbund, Wandervogel; 
Nobility: counted only above the level of von, and when no other function or occupation is 
listed; Socialites: Winifried Wagner, Eva Chamberlain, Daniela Thode; Widows and Pen- 
sioners: includes those explicitly listed as such, plus men listing military ranks a.D. without 
additional indication of occupation. 
